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OPTREX AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL
SIGNIFICANCE
SANDRA Liss FRIEDMAN*

&

HELENA D. SULLIVAN*

This article addresses the issue of how Judge Barzilay's decision in
United States v. Optrex America, and two subsequent Optrex decisions on
discovery disputes, interact with the Mod Act's encouragement of importers
to utilize the advice of counsel.
I.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Optrex America was a case
involving alleged negligent
misclassification of LCD panels and modules. Customs wanted to continue
depositions of two of the importer's employees, Tolbert and Banas, whose
depositions had been terminated by the assertion of attorney-client privilege.
Customs also sought to obtain certain documents/interrogatory responses
from the importer and to depose the importer's attorneys on the subject of
the classification of imported LCD products submitted to Customs at the
time of entry.
The court first set forth three purposes of discovery procedures: (1) to
narrow the issues; (2) to obtain evidence for use at trial; and (3) to secure
information as to the existence of evidence that may be used at trial.2 Judge
Barzilay further noted, however, that it was improper to use the discovery
rules as a tactical weapon in the litigation process.3
The defendant asserted that, among several experts, it consulted
counsel when determining the content of entry documents it submitted to
Customs. The court found that, because the case turned upon a finding of a
negligent act or omission as delineated in 19 U.S.C. §1592, the plaintiff
required access to information from defendant's counsel that it relied upon
when classifying imports. 4 The court further explained that once the
government proves the act or omission, the defendant has the burden of
proving that it did not behave negligently. Crucially, the court went on to
say:

* Sandra Liss Friedman is a partner in the New York office of Barnes, Richardson &
Colburn.
* Helena D. Sullivan is an associate in the New York office of Barnes, Richardson &
Colburn.
1. No. 04-79, 2004 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 74 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 1, 2004).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note to 1983 Amendment).
4. Id. at *4.
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If Defendant uses the ostensibly privileged information its counsel provided
as
5
a defense, this use of information marks the defense as "affirmative."
An affirmative defense, though, obviates attorney-client privilege with respect
to the advice that Defendant received from counsel concerning the entry
formulation because, when the content of counsel's advice becomes the object
of litigation, attorney-client privilege does not apply to that advice. A 'party
can waive the attorney client privilege by asserting claims or defenses that put
his or her attorney's advice in issue in the litigation,"' or "when a party
affirmatively uses privileged communications to defend against or attack the
opposing party." Similarly, in cases where a client's state of mind or
knowledge, such as whether the client acted negligently, is at issue, "the
attorney-client privilege with respect to attorney-client communications
that
6
have bearing on that state of mind or knowledge is impliedly waived."
Negligence on the part of Optrex would be disproved if Defendant can show
that it reasonably relied on its attorney's advice. The government needs the
content of this advice to assess the reasonableness of Defendant's reliance
upon it. To unwaveringly maintain attorney-client privilege in this
circumstance would effectively allow Defendant to use the privilege as a shield
and sword to protect 7itself against any such alleged misdeed and frustrate the
purpose of discovery.
Therefore, the court grants the government's motion to continue depositions of
Ms. Tolbert and Ms. Banas. Importantly, Plaintiff may seek only information
given by counsel to Defendant about classification determinations submitted
between October 12, 1997, and June 29, 1999-the period when Optrex made
the entries at issue in this case.8
Therefore, the court granted the motion to continue discovery of certain
employees regarding advice from counsel, and granted the request for
responses to interrogatories, while modifying them to dovetail with the
deposition questions by only including information about legal advice
regarding the filling out of entry documents during that certain period ("state
the advice Optrex obtained", whether it intends to rely on that advice,

5. Id. at *4-8 (citations omitted)(citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem.
Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing various cases in which the attorney-client
privilege has been waived because "the client has made the decision and taken the
affirmative step.. .to place the advice of the attorney in issue."); Beery v. Thomson
Consumer Elecs., 218 F.R.D. 599, 604 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ("An attorney-client
communication is placed at issue... when a party affirmatively uses privileged
communications to defend against or attack the opposing party.")).
6. Id. (citations omitted)(citing Beery, 218 F.R.D. at 604; Sax v. Sax, 136 F.R.D. 542,
543 (D. Mass. 1991); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975); King-Fisher
Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 570, 572 (2003)).
7. Id. (citations omitted)(citing Sellick Equip. Ltd. v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l Trade
352, 354 (1994) (describing the vast scope of the discovery process); Beery, 218 F.R.D. at
604 (Waiver therefore stops a party from manipulating an essential component of our legal
system - the attorney client privilege - so as to release information favorable to it and
withhold anything else.)).
8. Id. (citations omitted).
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whether it was advised that certain Customs rulings were applicable, etc.). 9
The court denied plaintiffs motion to depose the lawyers from Sonnenberg
& Anderson. Judge Barzilay noted that the depositions and modified
interrogatories she was ordering would fulfill the plaintiffs discovery needs
and, therefore, depositions of the attorneys, which could well disqualify them
from acting as counsel, were unnecessary.
The battle over discovery in that case did not end. Optrex America
made its own discovery motion to overrule the government's special
objections and general objections to interrogatories, to overrule the claims of
privilege that the government asserted in its answers to interrogatories and
requests for production as well as the Government's Privilege Log, and to
compel new interrogatory responses (duly correlated). Optrex also wanted to
depose Customs' assistant chief counsel, Jeffrey Reim, asserting that he
acted outside the scope of his duties as attorney when he assumed the role of
special agent during the underlying investigation.10 Judge Barzilay, in her
second opinion, noted that general objections to interrogatory responses were
impermissible, the 'specific' objections were not specific enough, and the
government's privilege log was too rudimentary to meet the standards
required for the assertion of privilege."
Judge Barzilay outlined the standards required.12 As the privilege log
was set out, the court could not determine the nature of the information Mr.
Reim provided to the government. The Court ordered that the government
provide certain answers to interrogatories, and that the privilege log be
revised if plaintiff wished to maintain its privilege claim. The court's order
also called for oral argument on the issues of the motion to depose Mr. Reim
and why the court
should not sanction the government for its discovery3
related conduct.'
In the third opinion of United States v. Optrex America, 4 the court,
having examined the revised privilege log, found all but eight of the
documents listed therein acceptable and meeting the attorney-client and
deliberative process privilege. The court denied the motion for deposition of
Mr. Reim, holding that the defendant had not demonstrated that it needed to
depose Mr. Reim in order to present a proper defense. 5 Three reasons were
given for this: (1) if, as the plaintiff implied, the government did have access
to certain former employees through Mr. Reim, defendant would know in
advance and could depose/cross-examine; (2) defendant should know the
whereabouts of its former and current employees and what information they
could reveal; and (3) it was defendant's burden, not the government's, to

9. Id. at *7-9.
10. United States v. Optrex Am., Inc., No. 04-80, 2004 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 76, at
*1-2 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 1, 2004).

11. Id. at *12-13.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 13.
14. United States v. Optrex Am., Inc., No. 04-92, 2004 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 92 (Ct.
Int'l Trade July 27, 2004).
15. Id. at *11.
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provide evidence that defendant did not behave negligently.16 The court also
considered sanctions and stated:
Customs may benefit from a better organizational system for its files, yet such
poor organization itself does not warrant sanction under USCIT R. 37. On the
other hand, the court reiterates to government's counsel that "General
Objections are not allowed" in any court in the federal system. The court will
look with extreme disfavor upon further government use of such improper
objections. 17
II.

THE STATUTORY PROVISION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The Mod Act' 8 changed 19 U.S.C. § 1592 by prohibiting the electronic
transmittal to Customs of false information or data, authorizing Customs to
recover underpayment/nonpayment of taxes or fees resulting from a
violation, specifying that a non-intentional repetitious error by an electronic
system is not a pattern of negligent conduct, and by defining commencement
of a formal investigation for prior disclosure purposes.
The legislative history to this section 19 noted, in the "Reasons for
Change" discussion, that the amendment would mandate that Customs share
responsibility with the importing community and that, at a minimum,
reasonable care would be used in discharging the activities for which the
importer is responsible. The Committee discussed the use of attorney
advice, stating:
In meeting the "reasonable care" standard, the Committee believes that an
importer should consider utilization of one or more of the following aids to
establish evidence of proper compliance: seeking guidance from the Customs
Service through the pre-importation or formal ruling program; consulting with
a Customs broker, a Customs consultant, or a public accountant or an attorney;
using in-house employees such as counsel, a Customs administrator, or if
valuation is an issue, a corporate controller, who have experience and
knowledge of customs laws, regulations, and procedures; or, when appropriate,
obtaining analyses from accredited labs and gaugers for determining technical
qualities of an imported product.
For example, in seeking advice for a classification issue, the Committee
expects an importer to consult with an attorney or an in-house employee
having technical expertise about the particular merchandise in question. In
seeking advice for a valuation question, the Committee expects an importer to
consult with an attorney or public accountant, and as appropriate, personnel
within the company knowledgeable regarding the importer's accounting
system and how cost elements are booked.
In using a qualified expert, the importer is also responsible for providing such
16. Id. at*9-10.
17. Id. at * 12 (citation omitted)(citing Optrex, 2004 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 76).
18. Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) (the "Mod Act") (enacted as Title VI of the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act).
19. H.R. REPNO. 103-361(I), at 120 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2670.
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expert with full and complete information sufficient for the expert to make
entry or to provide advice as to how to make entry. If the above steps are
taken, the importer will be presumed to have acted with "reasonable care" in
making the entry.
The following are two examples of how the reasonable care standard should be
interpreted by Customs: (a) the failure to follow a binding ruling is a lack of
reasonable care; and (b) an honest, good faith professional disagreement as to
correct classification of a technical matter shall not be lack of reasonable care
unless such 20disagreement has no reasonable basis (e.g. snow skis are entered as
water skis).
It seems apparent that the congressional intent was to put the attorney's
advice at issue but, at the same time, to go no further than establishing that
the advice was provided in good faith and was not utterly lacking in
foundation.2 ' One reason for this might be that the client, not normally
having legal training, would not be in a position to judge the correctness of
the attorney's advice. There is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress considered seeking legal advice in this context to be unprotected
by the attorney-client privilege.

III. MAY OPTREX BE RECONCILED WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND 19
U.S.C. § 1592?
Clearly, the state of mind of the importer is central to the establishment
of a violation of 19 U.S.C. §1592. Therefore, it is consistent with the
statutory intent to allow disclosure of the fact that advice was given to the
importer, and of the nature of the advice. However, a more difficult question
is whether Optrex America goes further than Congress intended. The
legislative history specifies only three requirements seemingly necessary to
defend on the basis of the attorney advice: (1) the advice the importer relied
upon was given; (2) the advice was given in good faith; and (3) the advice
was not patently unreasonable.
Although Optrex America does not discuss in detail when that line may
be drawn, Judge Barzilay tries to limit the damage to attorney-client
privilege by not allowing the attorneys to be deposed, by tailoring the
interrogatories, and by specifying that the "plaintiff may seek only
information given by counsel to Defendant about classification determination
submitted between October 12, 1997, and June 29, 1999 - the period when
Optrex made the entries at issue in this case."22
Perhaps, however, Judge Barzilay's attempt to salvage the attorneyclient privilege by limiting the questions to a certain time period and by
directing them to the importer's employees rather than the attorneys begs the
real question - whether those questions should be limited in scope. The
legislative history seems clear that it does not want to put the legal

20. Id.
21. During the breakout session, John Pellegrini described the attorney's advice as
"colorable."
22. Optrex Am. Inc., 2004 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 74, at *7-8.
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correctness of the attorney's opinion on the table in terms of identifying a
deciding point for establishing reasonable care under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. An
honest, good faith, professional disagreement as to correct classification is
not to be construed as lack of reasonable care. Rather, the importer need
only establish that the advice was given, and that fact itself controls, giving
rise to the presumption of reasonable care, except in exceptional
circumstances - where the attorney acted in bad faith, or where no
reasonable attorney could have given such advice. Therefore, any implied
waiver of attorney-client privilege by the client by relying on such advice
should be limited to matters where the legislative history states are relevant,
i.e., whether the attorney's advice was colorable.
How could a court tackle this problem without encroaching on the
attorney-client privilege? The only information that should be required at
deposition is what facts were presented to the attorney on which to base the
determination, and the advice that was given. The third prong discussed by
the legislative history, whether the advice was such that no reasonable
attorney could have given such advice, is a determination that should be
made by the court. Therefore, we propose that the subject matter of potential
deposition questions be limited to the facts that were presented to the
attorney 2 3 and the classification/valuation advice that was given. The
justification for discovery of attorney-client advice does not merit any more
intrusive inquiry, unless Customs comes forth with some evidence of the
attorney's malefides that merits further fact-finding. Anything more would
be abuse of discovery as a tactical weapon, which as Judge Barzilay notes, is
improper.
CONCLUSION

Although Judge Barzilay's decision in Optrex America did not allow
direct deposition of the attorneys on the subject of their classification advice,
it still raised a shudder among Customs counsel who feared that the case
would be used to erode the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege. Many
also feared that the possibility that their discussions with counsel could
become the subject of discovery might inhibit clients from being honest and
forthright with their own attorney when seeking advice on Customs matters.
Judge Barzilay's decision certainly did not find that depositions of
importers' attorneys would never be permissible, nor did it seek to define in
what exigent (or other) circumstances it might be required. The opinion also
left open the question of just how far the government can go in seeking
discovery on the advice given to the client. This deviates a great deal from
the legislative intent, which seems to favor a bare-bones inquiry. The
permissible scope of the inquiry made into classification advice has been left
undefined, and there is no indication on the level of detail that might be

23. To ensure that the importer has fulfilled the requirement set forth in the legislative
history of 19 U.S.C. § 1592 that it has provided "full and complete information sufficient
for the expert to make entry or to provide advice as to how to make entry." H.R. REP. No.
103-361(I), at 120.
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subject to discovery. Further judicial clarification, both on the scope of the
disclosure of attorney advice and the circumstances under which the
attorneys themselves might be deposed, is therefore mandated.

